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Abstract
With varying aptitudes in different occupations, individuals typically maximize income by
specializing in one occupation which promises the highest income. Due to numerous labor
market imperfections and uncertainties, the choice of best occupation is accomplished with
only partial success. We demonstrate that an income tax that reduces after-tax income
differentials across occupations tends to exacerbate the errors of choice made by individuals.
Following a model proposed by Tinbergen (1951) and developed by Houthakker (1974), we
use Luce’s (1959) multinominal logit approach to evaluate the magnitude of the distortions
due to errors in occupational choice caused by income taxation. In an example, we show that
the deadweight loss can be as high as a third of total income.
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With varying aptitudes in diﬀerent occupations, individuals typically
maximize income by specializing in one occupation which promises the high-
est income. Due to numerous labor market imperfections and uncertainties,
this is accomplished with only partial success. We demonstrate that an in-
come tax that reduces the after-tax income diﬀerentials across occupations
tends to exacerbate the errors of choice made by individuals.
Following a model proposed by Tinbergen (1951) and developed by Houth-
akker (1974)1, we use Luce’s (1959) multinominal logit approach to evaluate
the magnitude of the distortions caused by income taxation. In an illustra-
tion with a speciﬁce x a m p l e ,w es h o wt h a ta th i g hm a r g i n a lt a xr a t e st h e s e
distortions can be in excess of a third of mean income.
1A related paper is Sheshinski (1983)
22 An Occupational Choice Model
Individuals are endowed with aptitudes in diﬀerent occupations. These
aptitudes are represented by a vector (y1,y 2,..., yn),w h e r eyi(≥ 0) is the
value of the i-th commodity that the individual could produce in a given
time period if he/she did nothing else. Since the yi’s are constants and all
individuals have a given working time, value maximization implies that each
individual will work all the time on the occupation for which yi is greatest.
Generally, there is only one such occupation. If there is more than one, the
allocation is indeterminate.
In view of the many imperfections in the labor market, it is unrealistic to
assume perfect income maximization. We shall follow the approach suggested
by Luce (1959), that individuals maximize ”imperfectly”, the probability of
choosing occupation i, pi,b e i n gg i v e nb y





,i =1 , 2,..., n (1)
where q is a positive constant, representing the ’precision’ of choice.
As q →∞ , the probability pi increases monotonically, approaching 1 if
yi =a r gm a x ( y1,y 2,..., yn) and decreases monotonically, approaching 0,o t h -
erwise. At the other end, as q → 0, pi approaches
1
n
which means that all
occupations have an equal probability of being chosen, irrespective of indi-
vidual aptitudes. It is natural to call q the ”degree of rationality” (q = ∞,
”perfect rationality”).
3Assume that the aptitude vector (y1,y 2,...,y n) varies randomly over the
population with a continuous density function f (y1,y 2,...,y n). The distri-
bution function F (y1,y 2,..., yn) is then also continuous (and diﬀerentiable).
The marginal density functions in diﬀerent occupations need not be indepen-
dent.
Let G(z) be the cumulative distribution function for labor incomes, and













pi(y1,...y i−1,x ,y i+1,..,y n)f(y1,...yi−1,x ,y i+1,.., yn)
dy1...dyi−1 dxdyi+1...dyn
(2)
In subsequent discussion it will suﬃce to examine the case n =2 .F o r


























eqy1 + eqy2 f (y1,y 2)dy1 dy2
(3)
43A n E x a m p l e
Consider the bivariate exponential density function2
f (y1,y 2)=α1α2e
−α1y1−α2y2 (4)
and the corresponding distribution function
F(y1,y 2)=( 1− e
−α1 y1)(1 − e
−α2 y2) (5)
(a) Perfect Rationality
When q = ∞,p i(y1,y 2) is 1 when yi ≥ yj,i ,j=1 , 2 and 0 otherwise.













=( 1− e−α1z)(1 − e−α2z)
= F(z, z)
(6)
The corresponding density function
g(z)q=∞ = α1e
−α1z + α2 e
−α2z − (α1 + α2)e
−(α1+α2)z (7)
has an interior mode and positive skewed shape as observed in empirical
income distributions.
2This is the product of two univariate distributions. While not allowing for dependence,
this is a simple illustrative case that has zero probability of ties (see below).











(b) Uniformly Random Choice
At the other extreme, when q =0 , pi(y1,y 2)=
1
2
independent of (y1 ,y 2).














which, as expected, is the arithmetic mean of two univariate densities.











It is not surprising that maximization of income by individuals leads to
a larger mean income than when individuals choose occupations randomly3:



























. The sign of the diﬀerence between these variances depends on
parameter values.













The relative loss of income can be quite substantial. For illustration,
take α1 = .01 and α2 = .02 (corresponding to mean abilities of 100 and 50,
respectively). For these parameter values, the relative loss exceeds 36 percent
of income!
It can be shown that the distribution function Gq=∞(z) stochastically
dominates (in the ’ﬁrst-degree’) the distribution Gq=0(z)4.T h a ti s ,f o ra n y
concave utility function, social welfare is higher under perfect rationality.
Figure 1
Calculations for intermediate cases, 0 <q<∞,t u r no u tt ob ec o m p l e x ,
yielding no explicit analytic solutions.
4Gq=∞(z) and Gq=0(z) intersect once, with Gq=∞(z) steeper at the intersection point.
74E ﬀect of An Income Tax
The eﬀect of a progressive income tax on mean income is the same as the
eﬀect of a reduction in the degree of rationality, q. For simplicity, suppose
there is in place a linear income tax function t(z)=−a +( 1− b)z,w h e r e
the support level a, a > 0, and the after-tax rate b, 0 <b<1, are constants
and z is before-tax income. After-tax income is z − t(z)=a + bz.T h e











i =1 , 2,..., n (12)
It is seen that q and b (the after-tax rate) are interchangeable. Except in
the polar cases q = ∞ and q =0 , the marginal tax rate aﬀects occupational
choice and hence entails a deadweight loss in terms of mean income. We
have seen before that this eﬀect can be signiﬁcant. Of course, more detailed
calculations for alternative levels of q a r er e q u i r e di no r d e rt oe v a l u a t et h e
eﬀect of marginal tax increases and a corresponding increase in the support
level on mean income and on the distribution of after-tax incomes.
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